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I. INTRODUCTION
Many changes in health care policy occur at the federal and
state levels on an annual basis. Most changes reflect the four
guiding health policy principles of cost, quality, access, and eq-
uity. These same four principles were important thirty years ago
when Virginia and other states implemented Medicaid programs,
developed certificate of public need and professional licensing
programs, and formalized existing facility licensing programs.
Thirty years ago, the overriding goals included concerns over ris-
ing costs and assuring access to services of adequate quality for
all.1
Today, much of the health care law agenda is driven by federal
reimbursement legislation, as well as regulations and federal leg-
islation governing relationships between health care providers.
This article is not intended to be an exhaustive treatise of the
federal laws applicable to health care operations and transac-
tions. It should, however, be of assistance in identifying develop-
• A.B., 1980, Dartmouth College; J.D., 1985, University of Richmond School of Law.
** B.S., 1997, Davidson College; J.D., 2001, University of Richmond; M.H.A., 2001,
Virginia Commonwealth University.
*** B.A., 1998, University of Virginia; Candidate, J.D., 2003, University of Richmond
School of Law.
The authors acknowledge the assistance and support of Kim Alexander, Emily
Farmer, and Kim Gillespie in preparation of this article.
1. See Anne R. Somers, The Nation's Health: Issues for the Future, 399 ANNALS AM.
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCo. 160, 168-69 (1972).
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ments in the legislature, 2 the courts,' and health care agencies' of
the Commonwealth over the last two years.
II. STATE LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
A. Professional Licensure
Each General Assembly session brings new legislation affecting
professional licensure requirements and the scope of practice
among individual licensing categories. The 2001 and 2002 Gen-
eral Assembly Sessions were no exception.
1. Practitioner Profiling
Of primary interest to physicians were the changes in physi-
cian profiling legislation adopted by the 2001 General Assembly
in response to regulations governing physician profiles.' The pro-
filing was based on surveys that had been collected over the pre-
ceding two years as a requirement of 1998 legislation.6 Profiles
became available at the Department of Health Professions Board
of Medicine Web site in July 2001.' The profile information in-
cludes both licensing actions taken by the Virginia Board of
Medicine and other states' boards as well as information in gen-
eral terms on professional liability judgments and settlements.8
Due to its 2001 adoption of physician profile regulations,9 the
Board of Medicine received numerous inquiries and concerns
from licensees following the regular 2001 General Assembly Ses-
2. See discussion infra Part II.
3. See discussion infra Part III.
4. See discussion infra Part IV.
5. VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2910.1 (Repl. Vol. 2002).
6. See id. (requiring the Virginia Board of Medicine to make certain information on
physicians or podiatrists available to the public, including final orders of the Board relat-
ing to disciplinary action and other information related to competency).
7. See Virginia Board of Medicine Practitioners Information Web site, at
http://www.vahealthprovider.com (last visited Oct. 4, 2002).
8. Id.; see also 18 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 85-20-280 to -300 (2001) (implementing regula-
tions, including penalties for non-reporting).
9. See 18 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 85-20-290(B) (2001) (requiring the Board to make
available, as part of the profile information listed at www.vahealthprovider.com, informa-
tion regarding disciplinary notices and orders).
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sion. During 2001, the General Assembly enacted legislation that
was intended to address physician concerns about Web profile ac-
cess.1° Unfortunately, the new legislation made things worse. It
directed that the Board make complaints of misconduct available
upon a consumer's request identifying a specific physician,
thereby expanding the potential distribution of complaints prior
to Board determinations of any misconduct.11
The General Assembly removed all of the language added in
2001 in emergency legislation effective February 28, 2002.12 The
General Assembly further refined the method by which discipli-
nary actions can be reported online.13 Reports of pending discipli-
nary actions are now limited to a statement of pending disciplin-
ing proceedings.14 No further information on the specifically
alleged violation is provided until such allegation is investigated
and a ruling is made by the Board following an informal confer-
ence or full evidentiary hearing.15
The 2001 General Assembly also passed health practitioner
profiling legislation that requires oral and maxillofacial surgeons
to report information to the Board of Dentistry.16 The Board of
Dentistry subsequently promulgated emergency regulations gov-
erning mandatory reporting by dentists.17
2. Nurse Midwives and Chiropractors
Other proposed legislation, seeking to expand the in-home
practice of nurse midwifery, failed to get out of the legislative
committee. House Bills 889, 890, and 891 would have expanded
the limited practice of nurse midwifery in Virginia by one of sev-
10. VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2910 (Repl. Vol. 2002).
11. Id.; see also id. § 54.1-2914 (Repl. Vol. 2002) (defining unprofessional conduct); id.
§ 54.1-2919 (Repl. Vol. 2002) (setting forth the standard process for Board evaluation of
complaints against physicians).
12. VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2910.1 (Repl. Vol. 2002); see also Jeannie A. Adams, Confi-
dentiality of Department of Health Professions Information: Is It All It Is Cracked Up To
Be?, VA. HEALTH LAW. 2 (June 2002), available at http://www.vsb.vipnet.org/sections/
hl/June02Newsletter.pdf (last visited Oct. 4, 2002).
13. VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2910.1 (Repl. Vol. 2002).
14. Id.
15. See id. Informal conferences and formal hearings are governed by VA. CODE ANN.
§§ 2.2-4019, -4020 (Repl. Vol. 2001), respectively.
16. See VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2709.2 (Repl. Vol. 2002).
17. See 18 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 60-20-250 (2001).
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eral avenues."8 Specifically, House Bill 889 would have provided
for automatic licensure of those midwives who obtained the certi-
fied professional midwife credential, 19 while House Bill 891 would
have exempted such persons from licensure.2 ° House Bill 890
would have opened the door to certain midwives seeking direct
entry into practice.21
Greater self-regulatory efforts by chiropractors were similarly
unsuccessful. Efforts to set up a separate chiropractic board failed
in one instance 22 and were carried over to the 2003 session in an-
other.23
3. Pharmacy Practice
The 2002 General Assembly also amended laws governing the
practice of pharmacy. Specifically, amendments to Virginia sec-
tions 54.1-3300 and -3412 allow pharmacists to expand practice
locations to include clinics and allow pharmacies to maintain a
combination of paper and electronic records, as long as the re-
cords are retrievable.24 Other pharmacy legislation was intended
to enhance consumer access to needed medications 25 and to im-
prove patient and public safety.26
18. See H.B. 889, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2002); H.B. 890, Va. Gen. Assembly
(Reg. Sess. 2002); H.B. 891, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2002).
19. Va. H.B. 889.
20. Va. H.B. 891.
21. Va. H.B. 890.
22. See H.B. 1360, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2002).
23. See S.B. 261, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2002).
24. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54.1-3300, -3412 (Repl. Vol. 2002). The Board of Pharmacy
requires pharmacies to maintain rigorous guidelines for pharmacy safety and security.
See, e.g., 18 VA. ADMIN. CODE §§ 110-20-190, -200, -240 (2001).
25. See VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-3411.1 (Repl. Vol. 2002) (allowing nursing homes to use
pharmacists to transfer unused resident medication to indigent patients, free of charge);
id. § 54.1-3301 (Repl. Vol. 2002) (providing a mechanism for stock bottle donations by
practitioners and pharmaceutical manufacturers); id. § 54.1-3303 (Repl. Vol. 2002) (allow-
ing authorized professionals to dispense prescriptions); see also REPORT OF THE TECHNICAL
ADVISORY PANEL OF THE VA. INDIGENT HEALTH CARE TRUST FUND PURSUANT TO HJR 225,
2000, H. Doc. No. 8, at 3-7 (Va. 2001) (discussing options for expanding prescription drug
benefits to low income workers in Virginia).
26. See VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2520 (Repl. Vol. 2002) (establishing the Prescription
Monitoring Program for OxyContin and other Schedule II drugs, which requires pharma-
cists to report to central database); id. § 8.01-581.17 (Cum. Supp. 2002) (expanding peer
review protections for exchange of non-identifying patient prescription information).
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B. Licensure Requirements for Health Care Facilities
Regardless of how a health care provider chooses to organize it-
self, it typically must comply with specific regulatory require-
ments based on its licensure status. Minimal changes to facility
licensure laws were made in 2002.27 In 2001, the General Assem-
bly required outpatient surgical providers to maintain and report
data that had previously gone unreported.28
Beginning in 2002, hospitals, outpatient surgical hospitals, and
physicians must report data29 on selected outpatient surgical pro-
cedures to the Virginia Patient Level Data System.3" Before this
law was passed, health care providers were only required to sub-
mit inpatient data to the Commonwealth. Legislators hope that
the additional information collected as a result of this new law
will improve consumer choice and support health care provider
planning, utilization, and quality improvement activities.3' The
Board of Health subsequently adopted emergency regulations de-
tailing the data submission process3 2 for specific outpatient surgi-
27. 2002 General Assembly actions included changes to the appeal procedures for
nursing facilities challenging State Health Department surveyor findings from nursing
facility surveys. See VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-126 (Cum. Supp. 2002). Such surveys are re-
quired for the nursing facility's continued Medicare and Medicaid participation. See 42
C.F.R. § 442.12 (2001). Virginia Code section 32.1-126 allows nursing facilities the option
to pursue formal evidentiary hearings under VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-4020 in lieu of the in-
formal dispute resolution ("IDR") process. VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-126 (Cum. Supp. 2002).
Historikally, such IDRs have generally excluded counsel. A bill that would set staffing
standards in nursing facilities (House Bill 677) was continued to 2003 after legislators
were persuaded that funding and staffing availability were significant barriers to facility
compliance. H.B. 677, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2002).
28. VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-276.6 (Repl. Vol. 2001).
29. The patient level data elements to be reported for each patient receiving outpa-
tient surgery include hospital identifier, operating physician identifier, payor identifier,
employer identifier, patient identifier, patient sex, date of birth, zip code, patient relation-
ship to the insured, employment status code, status at discharge, admission type, date and
hour of admission, diagnosis upon admission, discharge status, principal and secondary
diagnoses, external cause of injury, co-morbid conditions existing but not treated, proce-
dures and procedure dates, revenue center codes, units and charges, and total charges. Id.
§ 32.1-276.6(B) (Repl. Vol. 2001). See 12 VA. ADMIN. CODE 5-218-40 (Cum. Supp. 2002) for
a comprehensive list of patient level data elements.
30. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 32.1-276.3, -276.6, -276.9 (Repl. Vol. 2001). The amended Code
provisions are effective until July 1, 2003. Id.
31. See id. § 32.1-276.2 (Repl. Vol. 2001).
32. Reporting entities performing more than one hundred of the specified outpatient
surgical procedures each year are required to submit patient level data in electronic data
format. Entities performing fewer than one hundred reportable outpatient procedures on
an annual basis have the option of submitting information in electronic data or hard copy
format. However, all reporting entities must use electronic format by January 1, 2004. 12
2002]
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cal procedure groups. These emergency regulations will be effec-
tive from November 1, 2001 through October 31, 2002."4
House Bills 1153 and 1312, introduced to enhance regulation of
the operations of abortion clinics, were defeated and passed by
indefinitely during the 2002 session. 3 The 2002 General Assem-
bly also set a timetable and gave a regulatory kick-start to Board
of Medicine efforts to set standards governing physician office-
based surgery, specifically addressing the conditions for anesthe-
sia administration.36 The Board of Medicine regulations are due
out in final form by late 2002.37
VA. ADMIN. CODE § 5-218-50 (Cum. Supp. 2002).
33. 12 VA. ADMIN. CODE §§ 5-218-10 to -90 (Cum. Supp. 2002). For the full text of the
emergency legislation, see Rules and Regulations Governing Outpatient Health Data Re-
porting, 18 Va. Regs. Reg. 634, 634-37 (Nov. 5, 2001). The emergency regulations set forth
three options for data submission. First, the reporting entity may submit the outpatient
level data to the Board of Health for processing and verification. 12 VA. ADMIN. CODE 5-
218-60 (full text available at Rules and Regulations Governing Outpatient Health Data
Reporting, 18 Va. Regs. Reg. at 636). Second, the reporting entity may submit the outpa-
tient level data for processing and verification to the non-profit organization hired by the
Commonwealth to compile, store, analyze, and evaluate the reported data. Id. Third, the
reporting entity may submit already processed and verified data to the non-profit organi-
zation. Id. Each reporting entity must notify the Board and the non-profit organization in
writing of the name, address, telephone number, email address, and fax number of a con-
tact person within the reporting entity's organization. 12 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 5-218-70 (full
text available at Rules and Regulations Governing Outpatient Health Data Reporting, 18
Va. Regs. Reg. at 637). Finally, if the data is submitted to the Board or the non-profit or-
ganization for processing and verification, the data must be submitted within forty-five
days after the end of each calendar year quarter. 12 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 5-218-80 (full text
available at Rules and Regulations Governing Outpatient Health Data Reporting, 18 Va.
Regs. Reg. at 637). If the data is already processed and verified before it is submitted di-
rectly to the non-profit organization, it must be submitted within 120 days after the end of
each calendar year quarter. Id.
34. 12 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 5-218 (Cum. Supp. 2002) (Editor's note). The Board of
Health is required to promulgate permanent regulations to replace the emergency regula-
tions if it wishes to continue to regulate this subject matter. See Rules and Regulations
Governing Outpatient Health Data Reporting, 18 Va. Regs. Reg. 634 (Nov. 5, 2001). How-
ever, when this article was authored, the Board of Health had not yet taken steps to
promulgate permanent regulations.
35. The first bill would have established specific licensure requirements by legislation,
replacing 12 VA. ADMIN. CODE §§ 5-410-1150 to -1360 (2001), which already regulate abor-
tion clinics per 12 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 5-410-10 (defining "outpatient surgical hospital").
See H.B. 1153, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2002); see also H.B. 2265, Va. Gen. Assem-
bly (Reg. Sess. 2001) (similar failed bill). The latter bill would have set additional report-
ing and malpractice insurance requirements, again singling out abortion clinics. See H.B.
1312, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2002); see also H.B. 2264, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg.
Sess. 2001) (failing to establish certain reporting requirements).
36. VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2912.1 (Repl. Vol. 2002). Physicians are seeking such self-
regulation with the hope of obtaining facility-based payments from managed care organi-
zations and even Medicare ambulatory surgery center certification. See 42 C.F.R. § 416.1-
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The 2001 General Assembly created an incentive38 for certain
hospitals to qualify under federal statutes and regulations for
critical access hospital ("CAH") certification by Medicare. 39 The
law allows hospitals to regain any beds given up to meet the criti-
cal access hospital eligibility criteria.4 ° The critical access hospital
incentive is intended to address the financial viability of two cur-
rent, and up to three future, candidates.4'
The 2001 General Assembly also took steps to ban human clon-
ing in response to success in animal cloning and the national
stem cell debate.42 This state action preceded federal action on the
issue.43
Another 2001 General Assembly change in response to more
flexible federal regulations" allowed hospital protocols that give
physicians up to seventy-two hours to sign verbal orders.45 This
law extended the period under existing regulations that allowed
verbal orders for up to twenty-four hours.4" The law also gave
Virginia physicians, consistent with each hospital's bylaws,4" the
.200 (2001) (governing certification requirements).
37. See VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2912.1 (Repl. Vol. 2002).
38. Id. § 32.1-125.3 (Repl. Vol. 2001) (allowing hospitals that reduce bed capacity to
qualify for the enhanced Medicare reimbursement).
39. See 42 U.S.C. § 1820 (2000); 42 C.F.R. § 409.1-.102 (2001) (authorizing critical
access hospital designation by Medicare).
40. VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-125.3 (Repl. Vol. 2001). These eligibility criteria include lo-
cation, b~d size, average lengthy of stay, and certain service requirements. 42 U.S.C. §
1820 (2000).
41. The two current CAH hospitals in Virginia are Bath County Community Hospital
and RJ Reynolds-Patrick County Hospital. For more details on the CAH option and Medi-
caid funding considerations, see REPORT OF THE JOINT COMM'N ON HEALTH CARE, CRITICAL
ACCESS HosP. PROGRAM STUDY (COPN FOLLOW-UP), S. Doc. No. OF (Va. 2002).
42. See VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-162.22 (Repl. Vol. 2001) This section bans somatic cell
nuclear transfer intended to induce pregnancy or the possession of the product of human
cloning and sets civil monetary penalties for violations in addition to any penalty provided
by law. However, it does not restrict certain biomedical and agricultural research or prac-
tices, including the cloning of molecules or animals other than humans.
43. As of this writing, federal legislation has been debated but has not been adopted
by Congress. See, e.g., 148 CONG. REC. S3631 (daily ed. May 1, 2002) (statement of Sen.
Spector).
44. See 42 C.F.R. § 482.24 (2001) (allowing "prompt" authentication and dating).
45. See VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-127(B)(11) (Repl. Vol. 2001).
46. See 12 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 5-410-230(c) (1996).
47. Each hospital is required by Virginia law, and as a condition of receiving Medicare
and Medicaid payment under 42 C.F.R. § 482.22(c) (2001), to have an organized medical
staff. The medical staff must adopt certain bylaws or rules governing medical practice
within the hospital setting. See VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-134.1 (Repl. Vol. 2001); 12 VA.
ADMIN. CODE § 5-410-210(A), (C) (1996); 42 C.F.R. § 482.22(c) (2001); see also Terzis v.
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option of relying on another physician or person authorized to is-
sue orders under state law48 to countersign the order.49
C. Certificate of Public Need
Following the 2000 amendment of Virginia Code section 32.1-
102.13,0 the Virginia General Assembly was supposed to provide
sufficient funds for indigent care in hospitals as a precondition to
deregulation. 1 The additional funding in subsequent years, along
with the adoption of new regulations establishing separate licens-
ing requirements for currently unlicensed services subject to Cer-
tificate of Public Need ("COPN") review, was suppose to allow the
three-phased deregulation plan to proceed.5 2 The additional fund-
ing was part of a compromise reached by the 2000 General As-
sembly that included health care facility associations, such as the
Virginia Hospital and Healthcare Association, and physician
groups, such as the Medical Society of Virginia.53
Unfortunately for deregulation advocates, the state budget
challenges have postponed the effective date of deregulation for
yet another year. In the meantime, new proposed regulations im-
Med. Ctr. Hosp., 235 Va. 443, 367 S.E.2d 728 (1988) (addressing legality under Virginia
law of disciplinary actions against medical staff physicians based upon bylaw require-
ments in hospitals).
48. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. §§ 32.1-134.2, -134.4 (Repl. Vol. 2001) (addressing rights
of podiatrists and nurse practitioners to participate on medical staff); 12 VA. ADMIN. CODE
§§ 5-410-210(c), -230(c) (1996) (authorizing podiatrist and nurse practitioner privileges
under Virginia law and requiring orders by persons authorized under state law).
49. Notably, this change may affect a hospital's compliance with state laws on the
timing of physician authorization, but it does not guarantee hospital payment for services
where payor rules require a contemporaneous physician signature or payor preauthoriza-
tion prior to payment for services rendered. See, e.g., 42 C.F.R. § 456.60 (2001) (requiring
physician certification of hospital patients at the time of admission in order to receive
Medicaid payment).
50. See VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-102.13 (Repl. Vol. 2001); see also A PLAN TO ELIMINATE
THE CERTIFICATE OF PUBLIC NEED PROGRAM, S. Doc. No. OA (Va. 2001).
51. While an indigent care funding mechanism currently exists under state law, see
VA. CODE ANN. §§ 32.1-332 to -342 (Repl. Vol. 2001), the deregulation plan proposal was
not approved by the 2001 session. See REPORT OF THE JOINT COMM'N ON HEALTH CARE,
SCHIP WAIVER FOR Low-INCOME ADULT PARENTS STUDY (COPN FOLLOW-UP), S. Doc. No.
OG (Va. 2002) [hereinafter SCHIP STUDY], available at http://legis.state.va.us/jchc/report.
htm#annual (last updated June 28, 2002).
52. SCHIP STUDY, supra note 51, at 1.
53. See Virginia Commonwealth University, State, Local, and Community Relations,
Legislative Highlights (Feb. 18, 2000), available at http://www.vcu.edu/exrel/GAO0/
hltl.htm (last visited Oct. 4, 2002).
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plementing the 2000 legislation have been promulgated without
the deregulation of services component.54 The 2002 General As-
sembly did pass two exceptions to COPN requirements and nar-
rowly defeated two others that would have led to further deregu-
lation prior to increased indigent care funding.55
54. See Virginia Medical Care Facilities Certificate of Public Need Rules and Regula-
tions, 18 Va. Regs. Reg. 2220 (May 20, 2002) (to be codified at 12 VA. ADMIN. CODE §§ 5-
220-10 to -500). The proposed regulations establish permanent amended procedures for
implementing the 190-day review process that now governs COPN reviews. See Virginia
Code section 32.1-102.6(B) and other changes which establish special exceptions to COPN
review criteria for rural health care facilities. See VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-102.6 (B) (Repl.
Vol. 2001 & Cum. Supp. 2002). See generally Virginia Medical Care Facilities Certificate of
Public Need Rules and Regulations, 18 Va. Regs. Reg. 2220 (May 20, 2002). The proposed
regulations were previously enacted in the form of emergency regulations. See Virginia
Medical Care Facilities Certificate of Public Need Rules and Regulations, 16 Va. Regs.
Reg. 1276 (Jan. 31, 2000). However, permanent regulations were not enacted in the one-
year emergency regulation period, leading to some- confusion over the applicable regula-
tions and COPN review process to be followed in the period after January 2, 2001.
55. See S.B. 490, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2002) (enacted as Act of Mar. 22, ch.
449, 2002 Va. Acts 709) (requiring the State Health Commissioner to reissue a request for
application for 180 new nursing facility beds, sixty in PD 11 and 120 in PD 13). The addi-
tional nursing facility beds were previously issued in two nursing facility batch cycles in
1998 and 1999 but were not developed due to the financial difficulties of the applicant in
each case. The Commissioner officially revoked the certificates in December 2001 for the
applicants' failure to make progress towards the completion of the nursing facility beds
and previous statement of inability to develop those beds, contrary to Virginia Code sec-
tion 32.1-102.4 (requiring progress towards construction and licensure of projects ap-
proved through the COPN process within a three year period). See Letters from Robert B.
Stroube, M.D., Acting State Health Commissioner, to M. Dean Cranwell, Esquire, Director
of Legal Services, Heritage Hall (Dec. 20, 2001) (on file with the author) (revoking certifi-
cates previously issued to HCMF).
The 2002 General Assembly also approved Senate Bill 643, a bill to allow Lucy Corr
Nursing Home to convert sixteen assisted living beds licensed by the Virginia Department
of Social Services under Virginia Code section 63.1-175 to nursing facility beds licensed by
the Virginia Department of Health under Virginia Code Section 32.1-126, as long as those
beds are dedicated to private pay and Medicare. See VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-102.1 (Repl.
Vol. 2001); S.B. 643, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2002) (enacted as Act of Mar. 22, 2002,
ch. 179, 2002 Va. Acts 162). The General Assembly rejected bills that would have elimi-
nated regional health planning and which would have removed cancer care centers from
COPN review. See H.B. 293, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2002) (proposing elimination of
regional health planning agencies) (continued to 2003). House Bills 883 and 885, contin-
ued to 2003 session, proposed deregulation of cancer care centers as specialized clinics de-
fined as projects under Virginia Code section 32.1-102.1. See VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-102.1
(Repl. Vol. 2001); H.B. 883, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2002); H.B. 885, Va. Gen. As-
sembly (Reg. Sess. 2002); see also S.B. 454, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2002) (compan-
ion to House Bill 883); S.B. 478, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2002) (companion to House
Bill 883).
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D. Medicaid Payment
The 2002 General Assembly faced many challenges in main-
taining a balanced budget as required by the Virginia Constitu-
tion.56 To reduce overall budget expenditures, the General As-
sembly required the Virginia Department of Medical Assistance
Services to cut general fund expenditures by $162 million over
the next two years.57
In the meantime, the outgoing Gilmore administration took
advantage of a loophole in federal statutes and regulations gov-
erning intergovernmental transfers to obtain approximately $259
million dollars in additional Medicaid reimbursement to local
nursing facilities. 5' The loophole allowed states to generate extra
matching funds by paying nursing homes and hospitals owned by
local governments more than they would normally receive and
then having them return the bulk of the funds to state coffers.59
According to the Department of Health and Human Services
("DHHS") Office of the Inspector General, twenty-eight states
took advantage of the loophole in 2000, increasing federal match
funds by $5.8 billion dollars.6" Given that there were no restric-
tions on how the funds were to be used, many states spent the ex-
tra funds on non-health care related projects.61 After facing a se-
ries of negative articles concerning the intergovernmental
transfer proposal,62 Virginia was able to get the assistance of two
localities to obtain the federal match before January 12, 2002, the
deadline under the January 12, 2001 regulations.63
56. See VA. CONST. Art. X, §§ 7, 8, 9.
57. See Patrick W. Finnerty, Address at the Virginia Health Law Legislative Update
(May 9, 2002) (on file with author).
58. Gordon Hickey et al., State Finds $259 Million Federal Loophole, RICH. TIMES-
DISPATCH, Sept. 29, 2001, at Al.
59. Id.
60. Dep't of Health & Human Serv. Office of Inspector Gen., Review of Medicaid En-
hanced Payments to Local Public Providers and the Use of Intergovernmental Transfers, A-
03-00-00216, at ii (Sept. 2001) [hereinafter OIG REPORT], available at http://oig.hhs.gov/
oas/reports/region3/30000216.pdf (last visited Oct. 5, 2002).
61. See OIG REPORT, supra note 60, at 3-4.
62. See, e.g., Jennifer L. Berghom et al., Bedford Backs Medicaid Fund Transfer
Agreement, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH, Oct. 23, 2001, at B7; Hickey et al., supra note 58, at
Al.
63. See 42 C.F.R. § 447.272 (2001); see also U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT
TO CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTERS: HCFA REVERSED ITS POSITION AND APPROVED
ADDITIONAL STATE FINANCING SCHEMES, GAO-02-147 (Oct. 2001).
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E. Privacy of Health Information
Acknowledging the many public policy reasons to protect the
confidential nature of a patient's health information, legislators
pass laws governing the treatment of health information each
year. In 2002, the Virginia General Assembly passed three laws
relating to health information. Instead of placing restrictions on
the sharing of health information, all three laws enhanced the ex-
change of health information.64
The amendment to Virginia Code section 8.01-413 provided
"authorized insurers" with new access to health care providers'
records and papers for a reasonable charge.6" This Virginia Code
section already required hospitals, nursing facilities, physicians,
and other health care providers66 to furnish copies of health re-
cords or papers to patients or their attorneys when such copies
were requested in relation to anticipated or ongoing litigation.67
As amended, Virginia Code section 8.01-413 requires health care
providers to respond to a patient's, attorney's, or authorized in-
surer's written request for documents by supplying the requested
copies within fifteen days of the request." Even though this new
law allows a greater number of people to access a patient's health
information, the law continues to protect the patient's confidenti-
ality by requiring providers to obtain a signed writing from the
patient confirming the attorney's or insurer's authority to make
the request.
69
64. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-413, 32.1-116.1, 32.1-127.1:04 (Cum. Supp. 2002).
65. Id. § 8.01-413.
66. Id. § 8.01-413(E). Virginia Code section 8.01-413 states that "health care provider
shall have the same meaning as provided in § 32.1-127.1:03 and shall also include an in-
dependent medical copy retrieval service contracted to provide the service of retrieving,
reviewing, and preparing such copies for distribution." See id. § 32.1-127.1:03 (Repl. Vol.
2001).
67. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-413(B). The law only applies to requests that are made in
anticipation of litigation or in the course of litigation. Id. Furthermore, the law applies to
heath care providers with offices located within or without the Commonwealth if the re-
cords pertain to any patient who is a party to a cause of action in any court of the Com-
monwealth of Virginia. Id.
68. Id. § 8.01-413(B) (Cum. Supp. 2002). If the provider fails to comply with the re-
quest, the patient, attorney, or authorized insurer may cause a subpoena duces tecum to
be issued. Id. § 8.01-413(C).
69. Id. § 8.01-413(B). The provider "shall accept a photocopy, facsimile, or other copy
of the original authorization signed by the patient as if it were an original." Id.
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The amendments to Virginia Code section 37.1-116 promote
the sharing of a crime victim's health information between emer-
gency medical services agencies and law enforcement officials.7 °
This Virginia Code section already required all licensed emer-
gency medical services agencies to report prehospital patient care
data using the established Emergency Medical Services Patient
Care Information System.7' Under the newly modified law, when
a patient is a victim of a crime, emergency medical services agen-
cies "may disclose the prehospital patient care report to law-
enforcement officials" as long as the disclosure complies with ap-
plicable privacy laws.72
Finally, Virginia Code section 32.1-127.1:04 provides for the
sharing of health information between state agencies.7 3 This es-
tablishes a secure system for sharing protected health informa-
tion among the Departments of Health, Medical Assistance Ser-
vices, Mental Health, Mental Retardation and Substance Abuse
Services, and Social Services. 74 According to the new law, the sys-
tem is established for
sharing protected health information that may be necessary for the
coordination of prevention and control of disease, injury, or disability
and for the delivery of health care benefits when such protected in-
formation concerns individuals who (i) have contracted a reportable
disease, including exposure to a toxic substance, as required by the
Board of Health pursuant to § 32.1-35 or other disease or disability
required to be reported by law; (ii) are the subjects of public health
surveillance, public health investigations, or public health interven-
tions or are applicants for or recipients of medical assistance ser-
vices; (iii) have been or are the victims of child abuse or neglect or
domestic violence; or (iv) may present a serious threat to health or
safety of a person or the7 public or may be subject to a serious threat
to their health or safety.
70. Id. § 32.1-116.1 (Cum. Supp. 2002).
71. Id. § 32.1-116.1(A) (Cum. Supp. 2002). "The minimum data set shall include, but
not be limited to, type of medical emergency or nature of the call, the response time, the
treatment provided and other items as prescribed by the Board." Id.
72. Id. The applicable privacy laws include the Virginia's Patient Health Records Pri-
vacy Law, VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-127.1:03 (Cum. Supp. 2002), and the federal privacy regu-
lations promulgated by the Department of Health and Human Services as required by the
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 ("HIPAA"). See HIPAA, 42
U.S.C. §§ 1320d-1320d-8 (Repl. Vol. 1998 & Cum. Supp. 2002); 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.500-.534
(2001).
73. Id. § 32.1-127.1:04(B) (Cum. Supp. 2002).
74. Id. § 32.1-127.1:04.
75. Id. § 32.1-127.1:04(B).
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Virginia Code section 32.1-127.1:04 also declares that
[t]he coordination of prevention and control of disease, injury, or dis-
ability and the delivery of health care benefits are... (i) necessary
public health activities; (ii) necessary health oversight activities for
the integrity of the health care system; and (iii) necessary to prevent
serious harm and serious threats to the health and safety of indi-
viduals and the public.
76
This declaration qualifies the disclosure of protected health in-
formation to the secure system as a disclosure that does not re-
quire patient consent or authorization under the Health Insur-
ance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 ("HIPAA").77
Two of the above new laws reference HIPAA, a federal law
passed in 1996 to make it easier for Americans to maintain high
quality health insurance coverage while changing jobs and to
simplify administrative transactions by increasing the standard-
ized use of Electronic Data Interchange. 8 Virginia health plans,
health care clearinghouses, and health care providers who engage
in designated electronic billing or claims transactions 79 should be
aware of the privacy regulations promulgated by the Department
of Health and Human Services pursuant to the requirements of
HIPAA. ° The HIPAA privacy standards"' become effective on
76. Id. § 32.1-127.1:04(A).
77. Id. § 32.1-127.1:04(B). This point is explicitly stated in the new Virginia statute:
"Pursuant to the regulations concerning patient privacy promulgated by the federal De-
partment of Health and Human Services, covered entities may disclose protected health
information to the secure system without obtaining consent or authorization for such dis-
closure." Id.
78. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320d-1320d-8 (2000).
79. These three entities are "covered entities" under the HIPAA privacy standards. 45
C.F.R. § 164.104 (2001).
80. Id. §§ 164.102-.106 (2001).
81. Depending on the type of disclosure, the HIPAA privacy standards require covered
entities to obtain a patient's authorization before disclosing the patient's protected health
information. Id. § 164.506(A)(2). The HIPAA privacy standards also require covered enti-
ties to enter into agreements with "business associates" in which the business associate
agrees to abide by the HIPAA privacy standards that are applicable to the covered entity.
Id. § 164.5-502(d)(1). Finally, the HIPAA privacy standards set forth various patient
rights relating to protected health information. Id. §§ 164.522, .524, .526, .528. For exam-
ple, covered entities must provide patients with a notice regarding the covered entity's in-
formation practices. Id. § 164.520. Patients must be permitted to access and request
amendment to their records. Id. §§ 164.524, .526. Covered entities must provide patients
with an accounting of disclosures, and patients have the right to request the restricted use
or disclosure of their protected information. See id. §§ 164.522, .528; see also 67 Fed. Reg.
53,182 (Aug. 14, 2002) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164).
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April 14, 2003 and, in some instances, may preempt Virginia law
relating to the treatment of protected health information. 2
F. State False Claims Act
The 2002 General Assembly enacted a civil false claims act, the
Virginia Fraud Against Taxpayers Act.83 The Virginia statute
mirrors the federal False Claims Act, 4 in that both statutes are
now applicable to billings by health care providers that are
known to be false or fraudulent claims at the time a provider re-
quests payment or approval.8 5 Under both the federal and state
acts, a private party may initiate the lawsuit as a qui tam plain-
tiff. 6 The success of the federal statute in obtaining recoveries for
the federal government appear to have the same intent and
scope. Under both the federal False Claims Act and the Virginia
82. Id. § 160.203. "A standard requirement, or implementation specification set forth
in the HIPAA privacy standards that is contrary to a provision of state law preempts the
provision of state law," unless an explicit exception applies. Id. One exception states that
the HIPAA privacy standards will not preempt the state law if "[t]he provision of State
law relates to privacy of health information and is more stringent than a standard, re-
quirement, or implementation specification adopted" under the HIPAA privacy standards.
Id. § 160.203. "More stringent" means that the state law is more restrictive of uses and
disclosures of protected health information than the HIPAA privacy standards, or that the
state law permits greater rights of access or amendment to the individual who is the sub-
ject of the individually identifiable health information. Id. § 160.202; see also 15 U.S.C. §
6805 (2000) (requiring states to promulgate regulations to implement Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act for protection of non-public personal information maintained by financial insti-
tutions).
83. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-216.1 to -216.19 (Cum. Supp. 2002).
84. See 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (2000).
85. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729; VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-216(A) (Cum. Supp. 2002).
86. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)-(d); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-216.5-7 (Cum. Supp. 2002). A
qui tam action means "an action brought under a statute that allows a private person to
sue for a penalty, part of which the government or some specified public institution will
receive." BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 1262 (7th ed. 1999). The whistleblower or qui tam pro-
visions of the federal False Claims Act and, by analogy, the Virginia Fraud Against Tax-
payers Act, allow any citizen who has knowledge of a fraud against the government to
bring suit in the name of the government and, for his or her efforts, to share in the pro-
ceeds. See 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729 3733 (2000); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-216.1 to -216.19 (Cum.
Supp. 2002); see also Emily W. Greenstreet, The Health Care Industry and the False
Claims Act Whistleblower, 48 MED. TRIAL TECH. Q. 311, 311-14 (2002) (discussing "qui
tam" actions and the implementation and enforcement of the Federal False Claims Act).
See generally David M. Respanti and Marc S. Laigaie, Current Practice and Procedure
Under the Whistleblower Provisions of the Federal False Claims Act, 71 TEMP. L. REV. 23
(1998) (summarizing history and recent practice and procedures under the federal False
Claims Act).
87. Between 1986 and 1998, the federal False Claims Act reportedly recovered over $2
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Fraud Against Virginia Taxpayers Act, a private party initiating
a qui tam suit files both in their name and the name of the gov-
ernment."8 Once filed, the lawsuit cannot be voluntarily dismissed
without the written consent of the Attorney General and the
court8 9
Complaints filed under both the Federal False Claims Act and
the Virginia Fraud Against Taxpayers Act are filed under seal.9 °
The federal False Claims Act provides sixty days for the U.S. At-
torney to review the claim and to decide whether or not it will in-
tervene.91 The Virginia statute provides the Attorney General's
office 120 days to review the complaint while under seal.92 The
federal and state statutes both require the government to assume
primary responsibility for the case upon intervention. 93 Under
both the federal and state acts, the qui tam relator is entitled to a
portion of any settlement or recovery.94 If the government inter-
venes, the qui tam relator is generally allowed fifteen percent to
billion for the United States Treasury. See Respanti & Laigaie, supra note 86, at 23. More
recent estimates based on settlements under the federal False Claims Act suggest that the
recoveries are increasing, in part because of implementation of companion statutes, such
as the Health Care Fraud And Abuse Control Program. See 18 U.S.C. § 1347 (2000); U.S.
DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERV. & DEP'T OF JUST. HEALTH CARE FRAUD & ABUSE
CONTROL ANN. REP. FOR FY2001 (Apr. 2002) [hereinafter FRAUD REPORT 2001] (citing over
$1.7 billion health care fraud cases proceedings with a total of $1.3 billion collected by the
Federal Government), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/pubdoc/hipaaOlfel9.htm (last
visited Oct. 5, 2002). These include over $100 million in civil claims against Vencor, Inc.,
$87.5 million against Quorum Health Group, Inc., $27 million against National Health
Care Corporation, $4 million against CVS Corporation (partially filled prescription allega-
tions), and $10.25 million from two California medical practice groups. See id.
88. Compare 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b) (2000), with VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-216.5(A) (Cum.
Supp. 2002).
89. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-216.5(A).
90. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-216.5(B).
91. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2).
92. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-216.5(B). Under both statutes, the U.S. Attorney or the At-
torney General may seek an extension of the time to review the complaint and the decision
on whether to intervene "for good cause shown." See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(3); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 8.01-216.5(C).
93. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(1); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-216.6(A) (Cum. Supp. 2002). In
both statutes, the government may decide to settle or dismiss the action over the objection
of the qui tam relator. The qui tam relator will have the benefit of an in camera hearing to
determine whether the settlement or dismissal is fair and reasonable. 31 U.S.C. §
3730(c)(2)(B); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-216.6(B), (C). Unlike the federal False Claims Act, the
Virginia statute includes a provision allowing the Commonwealth to petition the court "for
a partial lifting of the seal to facilitate the investigative process for settlement." VA. CODE
ANN. § 8.01-216.6(C).
94. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-216.7 (Cum. Supp. 2002).
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twenty-five percent of the recovery. 9 If the government chooses
not to intervene, the relator's share increases from twenty-five
percent to thirty-five percent.96 Implementation of the Virginia
statute and its use in fighting health care fraud in the Common-
wealth will be determined over the next few years.
G. Bioterrorism
Given the national developments in health care safety and se-
curity following the September 2001 terrorist attacks and bioter-
rorism scares, Virginia's passage of bioterrorism legislation and
participation in related federal grant requests is no surprise. The
legislation required certain health care providers to report to the
State Police information about a patient that may indicate dis-
ease caused by exposure to an agent or substance that can be
used as a weapon.97 New statutes require physicians and labora-
tory directors to make reports to the Commissioner, just as they
currently do for communicable diseases.9" In addition to legisla-
tion, Governor Warner recently endorsed two bioterrorism grant
requests by the Virginia Department of Health totaling $23.75
95. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-216.7(A). In both cases, the court
decides the percentage of recovery based upon the extent to which the person substantially
contributed to the prosecution of the action and in cases involving use of public records,
the recovery of the proceeds may be limited to ten percent. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1); VA.
CODE ANN. § 8.01-216.7(A). In all cases, the qui tam relator will receive an amount for
reasonable expenses that have been necessarily incurred, plus reasonable attorneys' fees
and costs. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-216.7(A).
96. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(2); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-216.7(B). One difference between the
federal and state statutes is in the treatment of persons who planned and initiated the vio-
lation on which the action was brought who still "materially" advance the government's
case. Compare 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(3), with VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-216.7(C). Under the fed-
eral statute, some recovery is available. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(3). Under the state stat-
ute, no recovery is available to a "mastermind." See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-216.7(C). The
Virginia statute also differs from the federal statutes in that it bars recoveries by inmates
and by individuals against their past or current employer where it can be shown that they
failed to exhaust existing internal procedures. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-216.8 (Cum.
Supp. 2002). This would appear to bar a Virginia false claim against health care providers
that implement compliance programs. See, e.g., Compliance Program Guidance to Individ-
ual and Small Group Physician Practices, 65 Fed. Reg. 59,434 (Oct. 5, 2000); Compliance
Program Guidance to Nursing Facilities, 65 Fed. Reg. 14,289 (Mar. 16, 2000); OIG Com-
pliance Program Guidance to Hospitals, 63 Fed. Reg. 8987 (Feb. 23, 1998).
97. See VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-35 to -38 (Cum. Supp. 2002) (requiring health care
providers to report to the Commissioner, who is then to report to the State Police concern-
ing outbreaks or unusual occurrences that may indicate disease caused by exposure to an
agent or substance that can used as a weapon).
98. See VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-36.
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million.99 The funds will be used for physicians and epidemiolo-
gists as well as bioterrorism coordinators, planners, educators,
and public information officers.' °°
III. CASE LAW DEVELOPMENTS
A. Family Medical Leave Act
1. The United States Supreme Court
In Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc., °1 the Supreme
Court resolved an issue involving Labor Department regulations
that affected Virginia businesses and which had been interpreted
by the Labor Department in a manner contrary to the leave enti-
tlement provisions of the Family Medical Leave Act of 1993
("FMLA").'0 2 This regulation applies to many Virginia busi-
nesses."°3 The FMLA guarantees qualifying employees twelve
weeks of unpaid leave each year and encourages businesses to
adopt more generous leave policies."°4 In Ragsdale, Wolverine
World Wide, Inc. ("Wolverine") accepted the FMLA's encourage-
ment of granting more leave than the minimum requirement and
gave Tracy Ragsdale ("Ragsdale"), petitioner, thirty weeks of un-
99. See Press Release, Governor Mark Warner, Governor Warner Endorses $23.75
Million Federal Bioterrorism Grant Request (April 16, 2002) (noting Governor Warner's
endorsement of the grant request using the funding approved by the original bioterrorism
legislation), available at http://www.governor.state.va.us/Press-Policy/Releases/April2002/
Apr1602.htm (last visited Oct. 5, 2002).
100. Id. Subsequent federal legislation has also been approved to provide grant funds
for bioterrorism preparedness and response plans In each state. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 247d-6
(Cum. Supp. 2002). A recent press release from the U.S. Department of Health & Human
Services announced that in January 2002 "President Bush signed into law a bioterrorism
appropriations bill that sent $1.1 billion to 62 states, territories and three major cities."
U.S. Dep't. of Health & Human Services, HHS Approves State Bioterrorism Plans so
Building Can Begin (June 6, 2002), available at http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2002pres/
20020606c.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2002). Twenty percent of the money for each state or
municipality was immediately released. Id. The remaining eighty percent will be released
upon approval of each state or municipality's bioterrorism plans. Id.
101. 122 S. Ct. 1155 (2002).
102. Id. at 1165; see also 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (2000). The specific leave provisions
implicated by this case are 29 U.S.C. section 2612(a)(1) (granting 12 workweeks of leave
per year) and section 2653 (encouraging more generous leave policies).
103. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654.
104. See id. § 2653.
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
paid medical leave.1"5 Ragsdale needed the medical leave when
she was unable to work due to surgery and radiation therapy for
her Hodgkin's disease.1"6 Following the use of thirty weeks of un-
paid leave, Ragsdale requested additional leave from Wolverine
or permission to work on a part-time basis.117 Wolverine refused
and fired her when she did not return to work.0 8
Ragsdale filed suit in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Arkansas, claiming that a Labor Department
regulation"' required Wolverine to grant her twelve additional
weeks of leave because it had not informed her that the thirty-
week absence would count against her FMLA entitlement."0
While "Wolverine conceded it had not given Ragsdale specific no-
tice that part of her absence would count as FMLA leave," it ar-
gued that it had complied with the FMLA by granting her more
than thirty weeks of leave."' The district court granted Wolver-
ine's motion for summary judgment, finding that the regulation
was "in conflict with the [FMLA] and invalid because, in effect, it
required Wolverine to grant Ragsdale more than 12 weeks of
FMLA-compliant leave in one year."1 2 The Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit agreed and affirmed the lower court's deci-
sion. 113
The Supreme Court affirmed the Eight Circuit's decision."' In
reaching this decision, the Court reasoned that the Labor De-
partment's regulation"5 "effects an impermissible alteration of
the [FMLA's] statutory framework and cannot be within [the La-
bor] Secretary's power to issue regulations 'necessary to carry out'
the Act under § 2654."116 Finally, the Court closed the door on any
future confusion between the Labor Department's regulation and




109. 29 C.F.R. § 825.700(a) (2001). The regulation provides that if an employee takes
medical leave "and the employer does not designate the leave as FMLA leave, the leave
taken does not count against an employee's FMLA entitlement." Id.
110. Ragsdale, 122 S. Ct. at 1155.




115. 29 C.F.R. § 825.700(a) (2001).
116. Ragsdale, 122 S. Ct. at 1165.
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the entitlement provision of the FMLA by stating: "[w] hatever the
bounds of the Secretary's discretion on this matter, they were ex-
ceeded here. The FMLA guaranteed Ragsdale 12-not 42-weeks
of leave in 1996.117
2. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
In the past year, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit decided two significant cases that interpreted a
provision of the FMLA in a new or different manner. These cases
were Miller v. AT&T Corp."' and Rhoads v. Federal Deposit In-
surance Corp. 9 In Miller, from September 1990 until her firing
in March 1997, Kimberly Miller ("Miller") was employed as an ac-
count representative by AT&T Corporation ("AT&T").12° During
the course of her employment, Miller was frequently absent from
work.'21 Following a series of discussions from her supervisors
concerning her absences and the issuance of several letter warn-
ings, a final letter of warning was issued in June of 1996.122 This
correspondence "specifically warned Miller that her next charge-
able absence could result in dismissal." '23 In December of 1996,
Miller became ill and was unable to attend work.'24 Miller sought
treatment at an urgent care facility and was diagnosed as being
severely dehydrated and suffering from the flu.'25 Subsequently,
Miller requested FMLA leave from AT&T for four days. 26 On her
FMLA leave request form, the treating doctor from the urgent
care center indicated that the "serious medical condition" prompt-
ing FMLA leave was "Influenza type 'A."12 7 AT&T denied Miller's
request for FMLA leave on February 26, 1997 because "the flu is
not generally considered to be the type of condition for which an
employee is entitled to FMLA leave."'28
117. Id.
118. 250 F.3d 820 (4th Cir. 2001).
119. 257 F.3d 373 (4th Cir. 2001).








128. Id. at 829.
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In August 1998, Miller filed suit in federal court alleging,
among other things, that AT&T had violated her rights under the
FMLA by denying her request for the absences due to her flu.129
Following extensive discovery, the district court granted sum-
mary judgment to Miller, holding that Miller's "particular case of
the flu" fit the FMLA definition of a "serious health condition"
and Miller had provided the necessary certification of her need for
FMLA leave.13 ° On appeal, the Fourth Circuit addressed two is-
sues raised by AT&T: (1) whether or not an episode of the flu is a
"serious health condition" as defined by the FMLA and imple-
menting regulations; and (2) if the flu is considered a "serious
health condition" under the applicable regulations, whether or
not those regulations are contrary to congressional intent and are
therefore invalid. 131
In resolving the first issue presented, the Fourth Circuit held
that section 825.114(c)1 32 "simply does not automatically exclude
the flu from coverage under the FMLA."133 The court further ex-
plains that "[r]ather, the provision is best read as clarifying that
some common illnesses will not ordinarily meet the regulatory
criteria and thus will not be covered under the FMLA." 34 The
Fourth Circuit dispensed with the second issue on appeal by not-
ing, contrary to AT&T's argument, 3 ' "the FMLA defines 'serious
health condition' broadly 'and does not include any examples of
conditions that either do or do not qualify as FMLA "serious
health conditions. ''' 136 Therefore, the court could not say "that the
regulations adopted by the Secretary [of Labor] are so manifestly
contrary to congressional intent as to be considered arbitrary. '137
129. See Miller v. AT&T, 60 F. Supp. 2d 574, 577-78 (S.D. W. Va. 1999).
130. Id. at 579-80; see also 29 U.S.C. §§ 2611(11), 2612(a)(2)(D), 2613(a)-(b) (2000); 29
C.F.R. § 825.305(a) (2001).
131. Miller, 250 F.3d at 824-25.
132. This section reads: "Ordinarily, unless complications arise, the common cold, the
flu, ear aches, upset stomach, minor ulcers, headaches other than migraine, routine dental
or orthodontia problems, periodontal diseases, etc., are examples of conditions that do not
meet the definition of a serious health condition and do not qualify for FMLA leave." 29
C.F.R. § 825.114(c) (2001).
133. Miller, 250 F.3d at 832.
134. Id.
135. AT&T argued that "the legislative history indicates that in enacting the FMLA,
Congress was focused on 'major' illnesses, such as cancer, rather than relatively minor
ailments." Id. at 835.




In Rhoads v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp.,138 the Fourth
Circuit clarified an employer's right to question certification un-
der the FMLA.'39 Under the FMLA, an employer may require that
a claim for medical leave, for either the employee's own or a fam-
ily member's condition, be supported by a medical care provider's
certification. 4 ° In order to comply with federal regulations, "[the]
employer must give notice of a requirement for medical certifica-
tion each time a certification is required."' The FMLA estab-
lishes standards for the certification.' However, a provider rep-
resenting the employer may contact the employee's health care
provider for authentication and clarification of medical certifica-
tion only with the employee's permission.4 If the employer
doubts the validity of the certification, it may seek a second medi-
cal opinion, at its own expense, from a health care provider of its
choice.' To avoid questions of validity and impartiality, this sec-
ond opinion cannot be given by a health care provider employed
on a regular basis by the employer.145
If the first two medical opinions differ, at its own expense, the
employer can require a third opinion. 4 This third opinion is final
and binding.'47 "The third health care provider [also] must be des-
ignated or approved jointly by the employer and the employee." 48
While awaiting the receipt of the second or third medical opinion,
the employee is statutorily entitled to the benefits of the FMLA 49
Finally, upon request, the employer must give the employee a
copy of the second or third opinion within two business days of
the request. 150
138. 257 F.3d 373 (4th Cir. 2001).
139. Id. at 385-86.
140. 29 C.F.R. § 825.305(a) (2001).
141. Id.
142. See id. § 825.306.
143. Id. § 825.307(a).
144. Id. § 825.307(a)(2). In addition, the employer must reimburse the employee for any
incidental travel expenses incurred by the employee in getting additional medical opin-
ions. Id. § 825.307(e).
145. Id. § 825.307(a)(2).
146. Id. § 825.307(c).
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. § 825.307(a)(2).
150. Id. § 825.307(d).
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In Rhoads, Lori Denise Rhoads ("Rhoads") was a financial ana-
lyst for Standard Federal Savings Association ("SFSA").151 She
"suffer[ed] from asthma and related migraine headaches-
conditions exacerbated by exposure to cigarette smoke."15 2 After
beginning work at one of SFSA's banks, "Rhoads [immediately]
began feeling the negative effects from breathing co-workers' sec-
ondhand smoke." 5 ' Although SFSA requested that their employ-
ees stop smoking on company premises "'out of professional cour-
tesy and human kindness,"' it was still unable to fully control or
eliminate smoking by its employees.' Due to this fact, Rhoads
was forced to seek periodic medical treatment for various medical
problems and allowed by SFSA administrators to "take lengthy
absences from work."'55 Finally, SFSA officials "arranged for her
to work from home to avoid exposure to secondhand smoke."'56
While working at home, Rhoads was transferred to another of
SFSA's operations centers.157 Shortly after her transfer, SFSA of-
ficials discovered that Rhoads was being allowed to work from
home and asked her to report to the operations center for work on
September 1.158 On September 1, instead of reporting to work,
Rhoads called her immediate supervisor at SFSA and informed
him that she could not report to work because she was ill and her
doctor had advised her not to report to work for the rest of the
week.'59 Following approximately two weeks of discussion be-
tween SFSA and Rhoads concerning when she would return to
work, a senior official at SFSA threatened her with disciplinary
action if she did not report to work by September 13.16° When
Rhoads did not report to work on September 13, she was termi-
nated on September 15 "for refusing to return to work for ten con-
151. 257 F.3d 373, 377 (4th Cir. 2001).
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. See id. (quoting an internal company memorandum).
155. Id. Rhoads "sought medical attention for recurring bouts of bronchitis, pneumonia,
severe lung infections, and cluster migraine syndrome." Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. Her retirement was scheduled to conclude with the effective date of a "smoke-
free workplace rule." Id.




secutive days '[w]ithout supervisory approval and in direct defi-
ance of' [supervisory) instructions." 6'
Rhoads filed suit in federal court alleging that SFSA had vio-
lated her rights under the FMLA.16 2 At trial, a jury determined
that SFSA had not violated any of her FMLA rights because "she
did not suffer from an FMLA-qualifying 'serious health condi-
tion."'163 Rhoads appealed the lower court's decision to the Fourth
Circuit claiming that "she should not have been required to prove
that she was afflicted with such a condition and, regardless, the
FDIC waived any right to contest this issue because SFSA failed
to follow the FMLA's 'second opinion'164 procedures upon receipt
of her physician's certification of her ailments."6 ' The Fourth Cir-
cuit affirmed the decision of the lower court and held that an em-
ployer's failure to request a second opinion will not preclude the
employer from later challenging whether the employee actually
suffered from a "serious health condition," entitling the employee
to FMLA leave.'66
B. Patient Rights
In 2001, the United States Supreme Court significantly
strengthened patient rights in Ferguson v. City of Charleston.'67
In Ferguson, patients challenged the medical practices used at
the Medical University of South Carolina ("MUSC").16' In 1989,
MUSC, a public hospital, the Charleston police department, and
the Charleston prosecutor's office formed a joint task force and
developed a policy requiring MUSC maternity patients meeting
certain criteria to submit to urinalysis drug testing for cocaine. 6 9
This drug testing policy was in response to "an apparent increase
in the use of cocaine by patients who were receiving prenatal
161. Id. at 379 (first alteration in original).
162. Id.
163. Id. at 381.
164. For the second opinion procedures refer to 29 U.S.C. § 2613(c)-(d) (2000).
165. Rhoads, 257 F.3d at 381. Rhoads's doctor wrote a letter certifying her medical
condition on September 13, but failed to fax it to SFSA until September 16, one day after
her termination. Id. at 378-79.
166. See id. at 386.
167. 532 U.S. 67 (2001).
168. Id. at 73.
169. Id. at 70-72. Those criteria can be found at note four of the opinion. Id. at 72 n.4.
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treatment" and the result of hysteria created by the largely un-
founded national "crack baby" epidemic of the late 1980s. 7°
Under this drug testing policy, doctors and other hospital per-
sonnel selected, on a discretionary basis, predominately low-
income African-American expectant mothers who had not come in
earlier for prenatal care or who underwent incomplete prenatal
care for testing.'7 ' These women were then induced to provide
urine samples that were tested for cocaine under procedures that
would yield admissible evidence at trial.172 Originally, if a patient
tested positive for cocaine, hospital officials coordinated with
Charleston police to have the woman arrested at the hospital.173
However, in 1990, the program was modified to give women who
tested positive for cocaine the opportunity to enter a drug treat-
ment program instead of being arrested.7 4
Plaintiffs filed suit against the City of Charleston, hospital offi-
cials, and various law enforcement officials involved in the drug-
testing program. 75 Plaintiffs were ten women, most of whom
were African-American, who tested positive for cocaine use while
receiving prenatal care at MUSC. 176 They asserted claims for in-
junctive relief and damages on a number of theories. 77 Primarily,
they challenged the drug testing policy on grounds that "war-
rantless and nonconsensual drug tests conducted for criminal in-
vestigatory purposes were unconstitutional searches" in violation
of their rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. 78
The district court found that the petitioners had consented to
the searches and upheld the drug testing policy and arrests. 179 On
appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
affirmed the lower court's decision.' 0 The Fourth Circuit held
170. Id. at 70, 70 n.1; see also Ellen Goodman, The Myth of the Crack Babies, THE
BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 12, 1992, at 69.
171. See Brief for Petitioners at 1-2, Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001)
(No. 99-936).
172. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 72.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 73.
176. Id.
177. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 86 F.3d 469, 475 (4th Cir. 1999).
178. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 73.
179. Ferguson, 186 F.3d at 476.
180. Id. at 484.
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that the hospital's actions were constitutional because they were
covered by the "special needs" exception to the Fourth Amend-
ment warrant and probable cause requirements.' The Supreme
Court granted certiorari to consider the issue of "whether the in-
terest in using the threat of criminal sanctions to deter pregnant
women from using cocaine can justify a departure from the gen-
eral rule that an official nonconsensual search is unconstitutional
if not authorized by a valid warrant."'8 2
In a majority opinion written by Justice Stevens, the Court
overturned the Fourth Circuit's ruling and held that a state hos-
pital's performance of a diagnostic test to obtain evidence of a pa-
tient's criminal conduct for law enforcement purposes is an un-
reasonable search if the patient has not consented to the
procedure. 8 3 The Court further held that the interests in using
the threat of criminal sanctions to deter pregnant women from
using cocaine cannot justify a departure from the general rule
that an official nonconsensual search is unconstitutional if not
authorized by a valid warrant.8 4 Finally, the Court bolstered pa-
tient's rights by noting that when state hospital employees obtain
evidence from patients to give to law enforcement for criminal
purposes, "they have a special obligation to make sure that the
patients are fully informed about their constitutional rights."'8 5
On June 20, 2002, the United States Supreme Court affirmed
the Seventh Circuit's holding that ERISAl s6 does not preempt the
181. Id. at 476-84. The "special needs" exception was first articulated in New Jersey v.
T.L.O, 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring). The "special needs" exception
allows the state to disregard the customary probable cause and warrant requirements of
the Fourth Amendment when two criterion are met. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 351 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring). First, the state must demonstrate that it has some "special need" beyond
normal law enforcement activities that make the search or seizure necessary. See id.
(Blackmun, J., concurring). Second, the state must show that its "special need" cannot be
achieved or would be frustrated if a court forced it to abide by the usual probable cause
and warrant requirements. See id. at 353 (Blackmun, J., concurring). If these two condi-
tions are met by the state, the court then uses a balancing test to measure the state's in-
terests against the person's privacy rights. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring). If the state's
interests outweigh the person's privacy interests, the state's search or seizure will be af-
firmed as constitutional-even in the absence of probable cause or a warrant. See, e.g.,
Nat'l Treasury Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665-66 (1989).
182. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 70.
183. Id. at 85.
184. Id. at 86.
185. Id. at 85.
186. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461
(2000).
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Illinois HMO Act, which provides for independent review of dis-
putes between health plans, such as Health Maintenance Organi-
zations ("HMOs"), and primary care physicians.187 Consequently,
HMOs cannot refuse to cover health care services deemed to be
medically necessary by the independent reviewer under the Illi-
nois law.' The case, involving services provided by a Virginia
physician, should have far-reaching implications for other state




In early 2001, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit decided two cases involving Medicaid and Medi-
care payment issues: HCMF Corp. v. Allen 9 ' and INOVA Alexan-
dria Hospital v. Shalala.'9' In HCMF, several related corporate
entities that operate nursing homes in Virginia (collectively,
"Plaintiffs") brought suit under § 1983 against the Virginia De-
partment of Medical Assistance Services ("DMAS"), which admin-
isters the Medicaid program in Virginia.'92 The Plaintiffs alleged
that DMAS had violated their federal statutory right "to 'reason-
able and adequate' rates of reimbursement under the Medicaid
program."
193
The Plaintiffs based this contention on the federal Medicaid re-
quirement contained in the Boren Amendment, 94 which requires
each state to assure the federal government that under its Medi-
caid program the state will reimburse nursing facilities at rates
that are "reasonable and adequate."' 95 Although the Plaintiffs ac-
knowledged that the Boren Amendment was repealed by Con-
187. Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v Moran, 122 S. Ct. 2151, 2171 (2002).
188. Id. at 2158. Virginia has its own independent review statute. See VA. CODE ANN.
§§ 32.1-137.7 to -137.17 (Rep]. Vol. 2001 & Cum. Supp. 2002).
189. Rush Prudential HMO, Inc., 122 S. Ct. at 2157.
190. 238 F.3d 273 (4th Cir. 2001).
191. 244 F.3d 342 (4th Cir. 2001).
192. HCMF, 238 F.3d at 275.
193. Id. The "reasonable and adequate" language is derived from the statute. See 42
U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(13)(A) (2000).
194. HCMF, 238 F.3d at 276.
195. 42 U.S.C § 1396a(a)(13)(A) (2000); see also Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498,
524 (1990) (establishing rights of hospitals and nursing homes to sue for inadequate pay-
ments prior to Boren Amendment repeal).
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gress effective October 1, 1997,196 they argued that a December
1997 policy letter from the United States Health Care Financing
Administration ("HCFA") continued the "reasonable and ade-
quate" standard from the Boren Amendment. 197 The Plaintiffs
pointed out to the court that HCFA's policy letter stated:
"states are not required to subject their existing rates to a public
process to the extent that those existing rates were validly deter-
mined in accordance with legal standards in effect prior to October 1,
1997." [Plaintiffs] urged that because DMAS had not adopted new
rates pursuant to a public process since October 1, 1997, HCFA's let-
ter effectively continued the "reasonable and adequate" standard of
the Boren Amendment for DMAS' rates. 
198
Therefore, "[Plaintiffs] alleged that the letter established a 'fed-
eral policy [that] creates federal rights enforceable' under §
1983."'99
The Fourth Circuit held that the "[Plaintiffs'] claim [was] not
cognizable regardless of whether the HCFA letter properly au-
thorize[d] the application of Boren Amendment standards to the
payments at issue here."2 ° The court based its holding on the ra-
tionale that "a formal regulation cannot by itself give rise to a
federal right enforceable under § 1983. ''2°1 Further, the court
noted that "[a] policy letter has even less legal stature than a
regulation. "202
196. See Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, § 4711, 111 Stat. 251, 507-
08 (amended 1997).
197. See HCMF, 238 F.3d at 276; see also Concourse Rehab. and Nursing Ctr. Inc. v.
Whalen, 249 F.3d 136, 140 (2d Cir. 2001) (applying Boren standards to calculate claims for
rehabilitative nursing services costs under rates adopted before effective date of the Bal-
anced Budget Act); Fla. Ass'n of Rehab. v. Fla. Dept. of Health, 225 F.3d 1208, 1217 (11th
Cir. 2000) (finding that the Boren Amendment continues to govern payment disputes for
services furnished before effective date of Balanced Budget Act); Exeter Mem. Hosp. v.
Belshe, 145 F.3d 1106 (9th Cir. 1998) (recognizing a continuing right of hospitals as of the
effective date of the Boren Amendment repeal to bring a section 1983 action to seek de-
claratory and injunctive relief claiming violation of Boren Amendment standards); United
Hosps. Med. Ctr. v. Waldman, 793 A.2d 1, 5 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002) (recognizing
hospital's right to challenge hospital rate reductions that took place before the implemen-
tation of the Balanced Budget Act for failure to satisfy the Boren Amendment standards).
198. HCMF, 238 F.3d at 276 (quoting Children's Hosp. & Health Ctr. v. Belshe, 188
F.3d 1090, 1095 (9th Cir. 1999)).
199. Id. (second alteration in original).
200. Id. at 277.
201. Id.; accord Smith v. Kirk, 821 F.2d 980, 984 (4th Cir. 1987).
202. HCMF, 238 F.3d at 277; accord Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576
(2000). Applying the rational basis test under an Equal Protection analysis, the Fourth
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In Inova Alexandria Hospital v. Shalala,°3 Inova Alexandria
Hospital ("the Hospital"), a Medicare provider, belatedly sought
reimbursement for the services rendered to Medicare beneficiar-
ies during 1994.204 In August of 1996, Trigon, the hospital's pay-
ing agent, disallowed about $290,000 of the hospital's requested
reimbursement for the fiscal year of 1994.2"5 In January 1997, the
Hospital filed a timely administrative appeal of Trigon's determi-
nation to the Provider Reimbursement Review Board ("the
Board") of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
("HHS"). 206 Upon filing the appeal in July, 1997, the Board sent a
letter to the hospital detailing a schedule for submission of "posi-
tion papers. The Board's letter explicitly stated that "prelimi-
nary position papers were due by November 1, 1998, and final
papers by February 1, 1999. "208 The Board sent a reminder letter
to the Hospital in September 1997 that repeated the briefing
schedule and warned that failure to meet the deadlines would re-
sult in dismissal of the appeal.2 °9
The Hospital did not file either a preliminary or a final position
paper.21° It claimed that these failures were the result of "internal
confusion" at the Hospital caused by Inova Health System's ac-
quisition of the Hospital, an event that had occurred "after the
appeal was filed but before the position papers were due."211 The
Board dismissed the appeal because the Hospital failed to file the
proper papers on time.212 Following the dismissal of the appeal,
the hospital challenged the Board's decision by suing the HHS in
federal court.213 The district court reviewed the Board's decision
to dismiss the appeal and granted summary judgment to HHS.214
Circuit also upheld a Virginia rule which provides for the reimbursement of nursing home
interest expenses at the reconstruction financing bonds interest rate rather than the
higher rates of a mortgage obtained by the nursing home to secure the bonds. HCMF, 238
F.3d at 277.
203. 244 F.3d 342 (4th Cir. 2001).













Following the district court's ruling, the Hospital appealed to the
Fourth Circuit, arguing that in dismissing the appeal, the Board:
(1) "violated the Due Process Clause"; (2) "violated the hospital's
right to a hearing under the Medicare Act"; and (3) violated the
Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") because the "Boards' dis-
missal rule is invalid because it was not promulgated under the
APA's notice and comment procedure."
215
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit was faced with two questions:
"(1) whether the hospital is entitled to judicial review and (2)
whether, if judicial review is available, the Board acted properly
in dismissing the hospital's administrative appeal."216 In regard to
the first question, the court held that "there are judicially man-
ageable standards for reviewing each of the Hospital's claims. As
a result, there is no bar to judicial review because none of the
Hospital's claims are 'committed to agency discretion by law.' 21 7
In regard to the second issue, the Fourth Circuit found that the
district court correctly determined that the Board can only dis-
miss an administrative appeal "if the provider cannot show ex-
cusable neglect for its failure to file a timely position paper. "218
Therefore, since the hospital failed to show "excusable neglect,"
no material facts were in dispute and the district court's award of
summary judgment to HHS was proper.21 9
D. Certificate of Public Need
The primary COPN case during 2001-2002 was Chippenham &
Johnston-Willis Hospitals, Inc. v. Peterson.22' The case involved a
hospital replacement application to replace a 153-bed hospital
215. Id. at 347.
216. Id. at 345.
217. Id. at 348 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (2000)).
218. Id.
219. Id. at 351-52.
220. 36 Va. App. 469, 553 S.E.2d 133 (Ct. App. 2001). The Supreme Court of Virginia
subsequently denied certiorari in this matter. Bob Rayner, Hospital Plans Hit Snag: Court
Sets Stage for Legal Challenge, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH, April 13, 2002 at Al. The case has
been remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with the Virginia Court of Appeals
decision. Id.
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with a 130-bed facility in an adjacent jurisdiction.22' The existing
facility was located in the City of Richmond.222
Following regional review, the Central Virginia Health Plan-
ning Agency (the "CVHPA") recommended conditional approval of
Stuart Circle Hospital's replacement at St. Francis Hospital.223
The Commissioner's staff recommended against the project, lead-
ing to an informal fact-finding conference.224 Chippenham &
Johnston-Willis Hospitals, Inc. ("Chippenham") sought participa-
tion in the conference and was denied such participation for lack
of good cause standing.225 Chippenham appealed to the Chester-
field Circuit Court, which held that Chippenham demonstrated
no substantial mistake of law on CVHPA's part.226 Chippenham
then appealed to the Virginia Court of Appeals.227 The court of
appeals found that Chippenham demonstrated that the CVHPA
had made a material mistake of fact or law in its recommenda-
tion, found good cause standing, and remanded the matter for
further proceedings.228
Upon remand, Chippenham will have an opportunity to have
its arguments considered by the new Commissioner.229 Such ar-
guments will delay, if not reverse, the Commissioner's prior ap-
proval decision.
E. Access to Medical Records
Recently in Virginia, courts have decided cases of note involv-
ing access to medical records. These cases are Virmani v. Novant
Health, Inc.,23° Green v. Richmond Department of Social Ser-
vices,"S' and United States v. Sutherland.232
221. Peterson, 36 Va. App. at 482, 553 S.E.2d at 139.
222. Id. at 474, 553 S.E.2d at 135. The existing hospital at the time of the COPN deci-
sion, Stuart Circle Hospital, subsequently closed.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 474-75, 553 S.E.2d at 135-36.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 475, 553 S.E.2d at 136.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 482-83, 553 S.E.2d at 140.
229. Id.
230. 259 F.3d 284 (4th Cir. 2001).
231. 35 Va. App. 682, 547 S.E.2d 548 (Ct. App. 2001).
232. 143 F. Supp. 2d 609 (W.D. Va. 2001).
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In Virmani, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit was faced with the decision of whether or not to recognize
a privilege for physician peer review materials.233 A physician
("Virmani") alleged that Presbyterian Hospital ("Presbyterian")
discriminated against him when Presbyterian terminated Vir-
mani's privileges. 234 During discovery, Virmani attempted to ob-
tain "all peer review records related to all reviews of physicians
for any reason, during the twenty years preceding his request."235
Presbyterian moved for a protective order, arguing that peer re-
view materials were privileged under the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence and North Carolina law.236 Refusing to recognize a privilege
for medical peer review materials, the district court denied Pres-
byterian's motion for a protective order.23
On appeal to the Fourth Circuit, Presbyterian argued "that the
district court erred in refusing to recognize a privilege for docu-
ments related to medical peer review proceedings."23" The court
held "that the interest in obtaining probative evidence in an ac-
tion for discrimination outweighs the interest that would be fur-
thered by recognition of a privilege for medical peer review mate-
rials."239 Therefore, in declining to recognize a privilege for
medical peer review materials, the court affirmed the district
court's order.24 °
In Green v. Richmond Department of Social Services,241 the Vir-
ginia Court of Appeals dealt with the issue of denying a father ac-
cess to his daughter's medical records. 242 Robert B. Green, Sr.,
("Green") was serving an eighteen-year sentence in prison for
marital assault and several other convictions.243 Green had one
daughter.2 44 Pursuant to a court order, Green's daughter was in
the custody of the Department of Social Services (the "Depart-
233. Virmani, 259 F.3d at 286.
234. Id. at 284.




239. Id. at 293.
240. Id.
241. 35 Va. App. 682, 547 S.E.2d 548 (Ct. App. 2001).
242. Id. at 683, 547 S.E.2d at 548.
243. Id. at 683-84, 547 S.E.2d at 548. Green will be eligible for parole in 2004. Id.
244. See id.
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ment").245 From prison, Green requested copies of his daughter's
medical records.246
In response to Green's request, the Department filed a motion
in Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court.247 The district
court judge found "good cause to deny Green access to his daugh-
ter's medical, hospital, and other health records, except to the ex-
tent authorized by his daughter's treating physician."248 Green
appealed this decision to the circuit court.249 In the circuit court,
the judge found that Green's access to his daughter's medical re-
cords would interfere with her disclosures to her therapist, would
be harmful to her, and was "not in her best interests."25" There-
fore, the judge denied Green access to his daughter's hospital,
medical, and other health records.25'
On appeal, the Virginia Court of Appeals noted that a parent
can be denied access to his child's medical records for "good cause
shown."252 The court further noted that the "testimony of the
therapist and the report of the psychiatrist are unrebutted by any
evidence explaining how Green's daughter, who needs psychologi-
cal treatment, would benefit or progress in resolving issues if
Green had access to her medical records., 253 Therefore, the lower
court's decision finding good cause in denying Green access to his
daughter's medical records, was affirmed.254
In United States v. Sutherland,255 the United States District
Court for the Western District of Virginia denied a hospital's mo-
tion to quash the government's subpoena to compel the produc-
tion of certain hospital pharmacy records in a case involving a de-
245. Id.




250. Id. at 686, 547 S.E.2d at 550.
251. See id. at 686, 547 S.E.2d at 549.
252. Id. at 686, 547 S.E.2d at 550. The court quoted from VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.6
(Repl. Vol. 2000). This section of the Virginia Code reads: "Notwithstanding any other pro-
vision of law, neither parent, regardless of whether such parent has custody, shall be de-
nied access to the academic, medical, hospital or other health records of that parent's mi-
nor child unless otherwise ordered by the court for good cause shown." VA. CODE ANN. §
20-124.6 (Repl. Vol. 2000) (emphasis added).
253. Green, 35 Va. App. at 687, 547 S.E.2d at 551.
254. Id.
255. 143 F. Supp. 2d 609 (W.D. Va. 2001).
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fendant doctor accused of the unlawful distribution and dispens-
ing of controlled substances." Although the district court judge
denied the hospital's motion, the judge recognized a strong fed-
eral policy to protect the privacy of patient medical records.257 The
court required the government to provide written notice to each
patient involved and to allow each patient the opportunity to ob-
ject to the medical record disclosure.258
F. Tort Claims and Professional Liability Insurance
Medical malpractice claims and awards in the United States
have increased dramatically.259 Between 1993 and 1999, the av-
erage medical malpractice award granted by juries grew eighty-
four percent from $1.9 to $3.5 million. ° The medical malpractice
plaintiffs bar's overwhelming success has caused insurers that
transact professional liability coverage in the medical field to
scramble for survival.26'
256. Id. at 610.
257. Id. at 612. The judge held that a Virginia statute, VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-
127.1:03(A) (Cum. Supp. 2000), which recognizes a patient's right of privacy in the content
of his/her medical record and sets forth procedural requirements for submitting a sub-
poena for medical records, was inapplicable. Sutherland, 143 F. Supp. 2d at 611. Because
this case was a federal criminal matter, state procedural law did not apply. However, the
judge explained that the Federal Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act pri-
vacy standards restrict a health care provider's disclosure of a patient's medical records
and indicate a strong federal policy to protect the patient's privacy in the content of the
patient's health information. Id. at 612.
258. Sutherland, 143 F. Supp. 2d at 612. The court held
that the government [must]provide written notice prior to production of the subpoenaed
records to the last known address of each individual whose records are sought under the
subpoena. The notice must inform the individual that he or she may object to disclosure
within five business days of the date the notice was mailed. If the government objects to
giving notice, it must show cause before this court as to why notice would be unduly bur-
densome or prejudicial in a particular instance.
Id. at 613.
259. See Joseph B. Treaster, Malpractice Rates are Rising Sharply; Health Costs Fol-
low, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 2001, at Al.
260. Id. In Virginia, awards in medical malpractice claims filed against health care
providers are capped. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.15 (Repl. Vol. 2000 & Cum. Supp. 2002).
By July 1, 2002, the maximum recovery limit in medical malpractice cases was set at
$1.65 million. Id. This amount shall increase on each July 1 thereafter by $50,000 per
year. Id. However, the annual increase on July 1, 2007 and the annual increase on July 1,
2008 shall be $75,000 per year. Id.
261. See Treaster, supra note 259.
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Some insurers have even started to look elsewhere for more
commercially viable business.262 Faced with a 2001 underwriting
loss of nearly $1 billion, the nation's largest malpractice under-
writer, St. Paul, announced in December 2001 that it would no
longer renew professional liability policies for 42,000 physicians
nationwide.263 In February 2002, MIIX Group Inc., a New Jersey-
based insurer, decided to stop writing medical malpractice cover-
age in five states, including Virginia.264
Other insurers have attempted to cope with the financial strain
by raising premium prices for health care providers. For example,
in July 2001 Virginia's Reciprocal of America asked state Insur-
ance Departments for a single rate increase of 150% for profes-
sional liability coverage.265
Liability insurance rate increases have been especially difficult
for our nation's long-term care industry. Insurance companies
that underwrite nursing homes generally provide coverage to fa-
cilities nationwide and distribute costs evenly over nursing homes
throughout the country. Consequently, the high costs for negli-
gence claims against long-term care providers in one state causes
liability insurance premiums to skyrocket for nursing homes in
other states.
An ambiguous statute in Florida started an avalanche of resi-
dent's rights lawsuits in the late 1980s that continued through
the 1990s.266 Florida's recent surge of settlements and verdicts in-
volving long-term care providers has taken its toll on Virginia
nursing homes. For this reason, the Virginia Health Care Asso-
262. See Terry E. Tyrpin, Tort Reform Would Cure Med Mal Crisis, NAT.
UNDERWRITER: PROP. & CAS./RISK & BENEFITS MGMT. ED., Jan. 28, 2002, at 25.
263. Tom Gorman, Physicians Fold Under Malpractice Fee Burden, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 4,
2002, at Al.
264. Neil Versel, MIIX to End Some Malpractice Sales, BUS. INS., Mar. 25, 2002, at 14.
MIIX Group, Inc. stopped writing medical malpractice liability coverage in Illinois, Massa-
chusetts, Ohio, Texas, and Virginia. Id. This decision came after the New Jersey-based
insurer reported a 2001 net loss of $157.6 million, which was much higher than the net
loss of $36.5 million from the year before. Id.
265. Chicago's Continental Casualty Company also asked for a 150% rate increase in
July 2001. Jake Bleed, Arkansas Doctors Feel the Pinch from Medical Rising Malpractice
Insurance, ARKANSAS DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, Feb. 4, 2002. Professional Advocate Insurance
Company in Maryland asked for a 100% increase. Id.
266. Karen L. Goldsmith, Florida Long Term Care Tort Reform 2001: The Good, the
Bad, & the Ugly, HEALTH LAW. NEWS Dec. 2001, at 8. Only ten percent of the nursing
home beds in the United States are in Florida. Id. However, Florida accounts for twenty-
one percent of total nursing home claims. Id.
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ciation is searching for a creative solution to the crisis. Some Vir-
ginia long-term care providers have started to enter into binding
arbitration agreements with their residents upon admission to
their facilities. 267 The nursing homes hope that this will encour-
age insurers to lower their liability insurance premiums.
IV. REGULATORY DEVELOPMENTS
A. Patient Safety
Beginning with the 1999 Institute of Medicine (IOM) study,
268
there has been increased interest at both the national and state
levels in patient safety and efforts to support patient safety and
medical/health care error reduction. In January 2001, the Joint
Commission for the Accreditation of Health Organizations came
out with its own manual revisions addressing sentinel events and
how to address them in facilities through development of root
cause analyses.269 Other national organizations prepared their
own error reduction reports designed to support the IOM study
and push patient safety and error reduction efforts into the fore-
front.
The Commonwealth has established its own organization
through the coordination and assistance of health care stake-
holders such as the Virginia Hospital and Health Care Associa-
tion and the Medical Society of Virginia. This organization, the
Virginians Improving Patient Care and Safety (VIPC&S), has
267. Agreements to arbitrate medical malpractice claims are valid and enforceable in
Virginia. However, a medical malpractice arbitration agreement is only valid if its terms
allow the resident to withdraw from the arbitration agreement at any time within a period
of at least sixty days after the termination of health care. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.12
(Repl. Vol. 2000).
268. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, COMMITTEE ON QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE IN AMERICA,
To ERR IS HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM (Linda T. Kohn et al. eds., 1999),
available at http://www.nap.edu/html/to errjis-human/ (last visited Oct. 3, 2002).
269. See JOINT COMM'N ON THE ACCREDITATION OF HEALTH CARE ORGS., REVISIONS TO
JOINT COMM'N STANDARDS IN SUPPORT OF PATIENT SAFETY AND MED.JHEALTH CARE ERROR
REDUCTION (2001), available at http://www.jcaho.orgaccredited+organizations/hosptals/
standards/revisions/index.htm (last visited Oct. 4, 2002).
270. See, e.g., INSTITUTE FOR SAFE MEDICATION PRACTICES, ISMP MEDICATION SAFETY
ALERT!, PLEASE DON'T SLEEP THROUGH THIS WAKE-UP CALL (May 2, 2001) (addressing
handwriting and symbol errors that could lead to potential hazards in treatment), avail-
able at http://www.ismp.orgMSAarticles/wakeupcall.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2002).
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met several times and is working towards collaboration of best
practice guidelines drawing from both health care and non-health
care sources. 17 ' The Virginia General Assembly supported the
fledgling VIPC&S coalition by expanding confidentiality and im-
munity protections to patient safety organizations. 2
B. Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act
After two years of stricter interpretations of the Emergency
Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act ("EMTALA"),273 the De-
partment of Health and Human Services signaled a change in in-
terpretation that was more favorable to hospitals receiving pa-
tients in emergency medical conditions. 4 Proposed regulations
modify the standards that apply to the definition of a "hospital"
for EMTALA purposes . 5 The new regulations would define a
hospital so as to limit the application of EMTALA regulations to
outpatient centers.276
271. See http://www.vipcs.org for more information regarding VIPC&S collaborations.
272. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.17 (Cum. Supp. 2002).
273. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2000); Special Responsibilities of Medicare Hospitals in
Emergency Cases, 42 C.F.R. § 489.24 (2001).
274. Under the statute and regulations, an emergency medical condition is defined as
a medical condition manifesting itself by acute symptoms of sufficient sever-
ity (including severe pain) such that the absence of immediate medical atten-
tion could reasonably be expected to result in (i) placing the health of the in-
dividual ... in serious jeopardy, (ii) serious impairment to bodily functions, or
(iii) serious dysfunction of any bodily organ or part.
42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(1)(A) (2000). The EMTALA definition also encompasses certain
pregnant woman experiencing contractions. Id. § 1395dd(e)(1)(B). If an emergency medical
condition is found during a routine screening examination in a person who comes to the
emergency department seeking treatment, the hospital has a statutory duty to treat, sta-
bilize, and more appropriately transfer the patient. Id. § 1395dd(b)(1).
275. See Medicare Program: Changes to the Hospital Inpatient Prospective Payment
Systems & Fiscal Year 2003 Rates, 67 Fed. Reg. 31,404 (May 9, 2002) (to be codified at 42
C.F.R. §§ 405, 412, 413, 482, 485, 489) (addressing EMTALA requirements through
changes in outpatient prospective payment regulations). The same regulations address
some of the concerns about the complex provider-based payment rules that will affect
Medicare and Medicaid payment after October 2002 to outpatient centers typically billed
as a part of a hospital. Id.
276. Id. at 31,404, 31,505-07 (limiting application of the EMTALA requirement to
dedicated emergency departments); see also 42 C.F.R. § 489.24(a), (c) (2002). The regula-
tions as proposed would also limit the applicability of EMTALA to inpatients only when
the individual patient is found to have an emergency medical condition which has not been
stabilized. See id. § 489.24(d)(2); see also Smith v. Richmond Mem'l Hosp., 243 Va. 445,
416 S.E.2d 689 (1992) (ruling on a similar EMTALA issue).
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One question raised by EMTALA legislation is the extent to
which it affects the involuntary commitment process in Vir-
ginia.2" A June 2001 Attorney General's opinion confirms that
the federal EMTALA legislation does not preempt or conflict with
civil commitments. 2" The Attorney General's opinion finds that
while community services boards may designate the facility in
which the person will be confined, the Board does not require a
hospital to admit the person over its objection 21 in cases inter-preting EMTALA requirements.28 °
C. Fraud and Abuse Issues
Anti-fraud activities against health care providers are on the
rise in Virginia and nationally. The number of fraud and abuse
cases that have taken place in Virginia over the past year re-
mains a secret, because the majority of fraud and abuse cases
brought against health care organizations are settled quickly and
quietly. Three fraud and abuse cases that affected Virginia pro-
viders in 2001 were HCMF Corporation,281 Chippenham Associ-
ates, L.P. 212 and the CVS Corporation.
21
277. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 37.1-67.01, -67.1 (Cum. Supp. 2002) (addressing emergency
custody and temporary detention order requirements).
278. See Op. to Hon. Kenneth Stolle (June 28, 2001) (noting that Congress has stated
its intent not to preempt any state law by passage of EMTALA, except where such law di-
rectly conflicts with the requirement of the Act); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(f) (2000).
279. See Op. to Hon. Kenneth Stolle, supra note 278. For additional regulations affect-
ing EMTALA, see Medicare and Federal Healthcare Programs: Fraud and Abuse; Revi-
sions & Technical Corrections, 67 Fed. Reg. 11,928, 11,935 (Mar. 18, 2002) (to be codified
at 42 C.F.R. pts. 1001, 1003, 1005, 1008) (establishing, under 42 C.F.R. §
1003.106(a)(4)(iii), the possibility of enhanced penalties against health care providers for
previous failures to follow EMTALA).
280. See Williams v. United States, 242 F.3d 169, 175-76 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding that
Indian Hospitals operating under Indian Healthcare Improvement Act do not have the
duty to provide emergency medical treatment to non-native Americans under EMTALA or
North Carolina common law); Petty John v. Mission St. Joseph's Health Sys., Inc., No. 01-
1140, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 23423 (4th Cir. Oct. 30, 2001) (holding that testimony by ex-
pert witness does not establish that hospital staff actually knew of a patient's emergency
medical condition within the meaning of EMTALA); see also Prosise v. Foster, 261 Va. 417,
422, 544 S.E.2d 331, 333 (2001) (holding that an on-call attending physician at teaching
hospital does not have a duty of care to a patient when the physician is not contacted re-
garding the patient's condition or treatment).
281. FRAUD REPORT 2001, supra note 87. HCMF Corporation is a privately owned nurs-
ing home chain. Id. (see "Department of Justice: Criminal Division" section).
282. See Motion to Approve Settlement Agreement with Department of Justice, at 1-2,
In re Chippenham Assoc., L.P., United States Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of
20021
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HCMF Corporation pled guilty to improperly claiming reim-
bursement for salaries and benefits paid to thirty HCMF owners,
family members, and employees who allegedly performed little or
no work or whose duties were unrelated to operating the eighteen
nursing facilities." 4 Based on the plea, HCMF admitted to having
submitted false and misleading documentation to Medicare and
Medicaid auditors in order to justify its claims.285 As part of its
plea agreement, HCMF agreed to pay restitution in the amount of
$1.7 million, the chairman of HCMF's Board of Directors agreed
to be jointly and severally liable for the restitution amount, and
both the Chairman and Treasurer pled guilty to making false
statements in connection with a federal health care program.286
These pleas by officers will lead to exclusion and possible criminal
penalties.8 7
In a recent settlement for its culpable conduct in operating a
nursing facility that had poor Medicare and Medicaid survey re-
sults, Chippenham Associates, L.P., and its manager agreed to
pay $250,000 and spend another $250,000 in facility improve-
ments to keep the facility operational despite Chippenham Asso-
ciates, L.P.'s bankruptcy.288
In the CVS case, the federal government alleged that CVS and
Revco Drugstores, Inc., violated the federal False Claims Act" 9
Tennessee, Case No. 301-00353 (Jan. 2002). Chippenham Associates, L.P. operated a sin-
gle nursing facility in the Richmond area. Id. at 1.
283. Revco Drugstores Inc. is a pharmacy chain which was acquired by CVS in 1997.
Government Reaches $4 Million Agreement With Pharmacy Chains, 6 HEALTH CARE
FRAUD LIT. REP., 2001, at 10 [hereinafter Pharmacy Chains].





288. See Settlement Agreement, attached as Exhibit A to January 4, 2002 Motion to
Approve Settlement Agreement with Department of Justice, In re Chippenham Assoc.,
L.P., United States Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Tennessee, Case No. 301-
00353 (Jan. 2002).
289. In an action involving the federal False Claims Act, the government or a qui tam
relator must prove: (1) that the defendant presented, or caused to be presented, a claim to
the federal government; (2) that the claim was false or fraudulent; and (3) that the defen-
dant knew the claim was fraudulent. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1) (2000). According to the statu-
tory definition, a "claim" includes "any request or demand.., for money or property which
is made to a contractor, grantee, or other recipient if the United States Government" ei-
ther provides any portion or reimburses for any portion of the requested money or prop-
erty. Id. § 3729(c). See also the Virginia Fraud Against Taxpayers Act, discussed supra
Part II.F (addressing new Virginia laws mirroring Federal False Claims Act).
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when the parties billed federal and state health care programs for
medications in amounts exceeding what actually was given out to
the patients.29 ° CVS and Revco allegedly dispensed partial pre-
scriptions to patients and billed the government programs for full
prescriptions.2 9' CVS agreed to settle the allegations by paying $4
million to the federal government, the District of Columbia, and
several participating states, including Virginia.29 2 In addition,
CVS was required to enter into an integrity agreement with the
Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Inspector
General ("OIG").293
To avoid potential criminal actions or civil liabilities in fraud
and abuse allegations, health care providers should, at the very
least, be aware of the most recent advisory opinions issued by the
OIG. Over the past year and a half, the OIG issued twenty-eight
advisory opinions.294 Additional resources are also available on
the Office of Inspector General Web site,2 95 including links to OIG
compliance program advice for various health care providers, lists
of persons no longer able to provide services to federal health care
programs such as Medicare and Medicaid, and specific reports
and information for health care providers and their counsel con-
cerning regulatory activities of the OIG and changes in enforce-
ment policies and practice.2 96
290. See Pharmacy Chains, supra note 283, at 10.
291. Id.
292. Id. Participating states included Virginia, Alabama, Connecticut, Georgia, Illinois,
Indiana, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North
Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Vermont, and
West Virginia. Id.
293. Id. A separate $9 million settlement agreement with Eckerd Corp. was recently
announced. See Eckerd Settles Partial Fill Claims, MEDICAL NEWSWIRE, May 31, 2002, at
2, available at http://www.medicalnewswire.com/archive (select "Medical Newswire") (last
visited Oct. 4, 2002).
294. The opinions were released between January 2001 and May 2002. They are avail-
able at http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/advisoryopinions/html (last visited Oct. 4, 2002).
295. Web site of the Office of the Inspector General, at http://oig.hhs.gov (last visited
Oct. 3, 2002)
296. See, e.g., Office of the Inspector General, Janet Rehnquist, An Open Letter to
Health Care Providers (November 20, 2001) (responding to concerns raised by Congress
and by individual health care providers of the False Claims Act enforcement tools and po-
tential abuse and promoting voluntary compliance efforts by health care providers), avail-
able at http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/openletters/openletterlll90l.htm (last visited Oct. 4,
2002); see also U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-02-546 DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FALSE CLAIMS ACT GUIDANCE (2002) (noting improvements in the efforts by the Depart-
ment of Justice to ensure observance of guidelines that the DOJ issued to reform False
Claims Act enforcement).
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D. Medicaid Reimbursement
Many regulatory changes in Medicaid payments to providers
have occurred in 2001 and 2002. Hospital reimbursement under
the Diagnosis Related Group ("DRG")297 system has been phased
in over the last five years, with mixed reviews. A managed care
payment system for hospital care has been phased in over the
same time period.29
Payments to nursing facilities are now based upon the MDS
299
reports that each nursing facility makes on each Medicaid eligible
resident. 00 This new system of payment for Medicaid operation
costs follows a change in Medicaid payment for plant costs in
nursing facilities over the last year.3' Other changes in Medicaid
payment to ambulances and other providers have also occurred
over the last year.0 2
V. CONCLUSION
There is a joke that follows a late night television sequence on
the top ten reasons to be a health care lawyer. One of the top ten
reasons is "likes to fall asleep reading the Federal Register." In
Virginia over the last two years, the same could be said about
297. Diagnosis Related Groups, or DRGs, are the current payment methodology used
by DMAS for hospitals still subject to fee for service payment. See REPORT OF THE JOINT
LEGISLATIVE AUDIT & REVIEW COMM'N: MEDICAID INPATIENT HOSPITAL AND
REIMBURSEMENT SYSTEM, H.R. Doc. No. 25, at 18 (2000).
298. The Medallion managed care initiative began January 1, 1996, and has expanded
over recent years. See 12 VA. ADMIN. CODE §§ 30-120-260 to -350 (Cum. Supp. 2002). The
program requires mandatory enrollment into a contracted health maintenance organiza-
tion (HMO) for specific groups of Medicaid beneficiaries in Virginia. See 12 VA. ADMIN.
CODE §§ 30-120-360 to -440 (Cum. Supp. 2002) (establishing DMAS Medallion II regula-
tions).
299. MDS stands for "Minimum Data Set," a collection of information on each resi-
dent's activities of daily living skills at various points during a nursing facility stay.
300. See 12 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 30-40-90 to -200 (Cum. Supp. 2002) (proposing regula-
tions to establish new payment system using resource utilization groups, or RUGs, for
MDS Data for Medicaid payment purposes). There are recent studies of efforts to monitor
use of MDS data for payment purposes in other states. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, NURSING HOMES: FEDERAL EFFORTS TO MONITOR RESIDENT ASSESSMENT DATA
SHOULD COMPLEMENT STATE ACTIVITIES, GAO-02-312 (2002) [hereinafter NURSING
HOMES].
301. See 12 VA. ADMIN. CODE 30-90-29 to -120 (Cum. Supp. 2002) (establishing ten-
year phase in of new plant cost reimbursement system).




reading the Virginia Register. Much has occurred in health law,
too much to condense into this note. While the authors wished to
address new developments in mental health, 0 3 tax exemption
status,0 4 patient rights,0 5 Durable Do Not Resuscitate Orders,30 6
children's health insurance,30 7 and the Americans with Disabili-
ties Act (ADA)30 in more detail, those matters will have to be left
to future survey articles. However as this survey demonstrates,
there have been significant developments in health care law gen-
erated by the Virginia General Assembly, the courts, and admin-
istrative agencies. Most of these changes alter at least one of the
health policy principles of cost, quality, access, and equity. In ad-
dition, the article demonstrates the increasing role that federal
reimbursement legislation is playing in health care law.
303. See Rules and Regulations to Assure the Rights of Individuals Receiving Services
from Providers of Mental Health, Mental Retardation and Substance Abuse Services, 12
VA. ADMIN. CODE 35-115-10 (Cum. Supp. 2002).
304. During the 2002 General Assembly Session, Virginia lawmakers passed Senate
Bill 676, which amended the Virginia Code by adding section 17.1-513.01. See S.B. 676,
Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2002) (enacted as Act of Apr. 8, 2002, ch. 792, 2002 Va. Acts
332). This new law provides that assets of Virginia charitable corporations, such as a not-
for-profit hospital, are deemed to be held in trust for the public, and that the Attorney
General has the authority to act on behalf of the public with respect to such assets. Id.
305. See Hospital COPs for Patients' Rights, Questions and Answers, (Oct. 10, 2001)
(providing guidance to hospitals on implementing interim final rule at 64 Fed. Reg. 36,070
(July 2, 1999)), at http://www.cms.hhs.vo/cop/2bl.asp (last visited Oct. 4, 2002); see also
NURSING HOMES, supra note 300.
306. See VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2987.1 (Repl. Vol. 2002) (defining Durable Do Not Re-
suscitate Order ("DDNR"); see also 12 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 5-65-10 to -110 (Cum. Supp.
2002) (creating new regulations governing DDNR).
307. The Family Access to Medical Insurance Security Plan ("FAMIS"), formerly known
as Virginia Children's Medical Security Insurance Plan ("VCMSIP"), provides health care
coverage assistance for children through the age of eighteen who currently do not have
health insurance and who meet the financial criteria set by the state. The program is fi-
nanced by state and federal governmental funds, and is designed to cover children of
working Virginia families that do not qualify for medical assistance under Medicaid and
cannot afford private insurance. In recent years, the Commonwealth has made significant
efforts to increase enrollment numbers for this program. See Family Access to Medical In-
surance Security Plan, 12 VA. ADMIN. CODE 30-141-10 to -650 (Repl. Vol. 1996 & Cum.
Supp. 2002); see also 12 VA. ADMIN. CODE 30-140-10 (Cum. Supp. 2002).
308. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal, 122 S. Ct. 2045 (2002) (defining "direct
threat" under Americans with Disabilities Act to include an employer's refusal to hire or
retain an employee at a job site due to the direct threat posed to the employee's health).
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